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Abstract
The last decade has seen substantial progress on designing Byzantine agreement algorithms which
are scalable in that they do not require all-to-all communication among nodes. These protocols require
each node to play a particular role determined by its ID, and to send to specific neighbors. Motivated, in
part, by the rise of permissionless systems such as Bitcoin where arbitrary nodes (whose identities are
not known apriori) can join and leave at will, we extend this research to a more practical model where
each node (initially) does not know the identity of its neighbors. In particular, a node can send to new
destinations only by sending to random (or arbitrary) nodes, or responding (if it chooses) to messages
received from those destinations. We assume a synchronous and fully-connected network, with a full-
information, but static Byzantine adversary. A general drawback of existing Byzantine protocols is that
the communication cost incurred by the honest nodes may not be proportional to those incurred by the
Byzantine nodes; in fact, they can be significantly higher. Our goal is to design Byzantine protocols for
fundamental problems which are resource competitive, i.e., the total number of bits sent by all the honest
nodes is not significantly more than those sent by the Byzantine nodes.
We describe a randomized scalable algorithm to solve Byzantine agreement, leader election, and
committee election in this model. Our algorithm sends an expected O((T + n) log n) bits and has
latency O(polylog(n)), where n is the number of nodes, and T is the minimum of n2 and the number of
bits sent by adversarially controlled nodes. The algorithm is resilient to (1/4− )n Byzantine nodes for
any fixed  > 0, and succeeds with high probability1. Our work can be considered as a first application
of resource-competitive analysis to fundamental Byzantine problems.
To complement our algorithm we also show lower bounds for resource-competitive Byzantine agree-
ment. We prove that, in general, one cannot hope to design Byzantine protocols that have communication
cost that is significantly smaller than the cost of the Byzantine adversary.
Keywords: Byzantine protocol, Byzantine agreement, Leader election, Committee election, Resource-
competitive protocol, Randomized protocol
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1 Introduction
What happens when you don’t know your neighbors? Anonymity is critical in many modern networks
including cryptocurrency [10, 22], anonymous communication [24, 56], and wireless [37, 41, 57, 54]. In
anonymous networks, nodes are generally known only by self-generated identifiers2; and communication
primitives may be limited to: sending a message to all nodes, sending a message to a random (or arbitrary)
node, and responding to a message sent directly. Unfortunately, all algorithms to coordinate such networks
in the presence of malicious faults seem either to require all-to-all communication, or make cryptographic
assumptions.
The open nature of permissionless systems such as Bitcoin allow many nodes to enter the network with
little or no admission control. A major challenge in such systems is dealing with malicious (also called
Byzantine) nodes, which can try to foil the protocols executed by honest (good) nodes. Byzantine-resistant
protocols are at the heart of secure and robust networks that can tolerate malicious nodes, such as P2P
networks. Consider the real-world example of Bitcoin — a decentralized P2P-based digital currency [10].
A crucial aspect of Bitcoin is a computational mechanism that allows fault-tolerant agreement on a set of
ordered transactions. Agreement in Bitcoin is achieved via a computationally-expensive operation, called
mining.
The problem of achieving agreement under Byzantine faults, Byzantine agreement, is a fundamental
and long-studied problem in distributed computing [49, 6, 43]. In the Byzantine agreement problem, all
good nodes start with an input bit, and we must ensure two conditions: (1) All good nodes output the same
input bit (consensus condition) and (2) the common bit should be the input bit of some good node (validity
condition). This must be done despite the presence of a constant fraction of Byzantine nodes that can deviate
arbitrarily from the protocol executed by the good nodes. Byzantine agreement is a “keystone” problem in
distributed computing, in that it provides a critical building block for creating attack-resistant distributed
systems. Its importance can be seen from widespread and continued application in many domains: sensor
networks [53], grid computing [5], peer-to-peer networks [52] and cloud computing [58]. However, despite
intensive research, there has still not been a practical solution to the Byzantine agreement problem for large
networks. A main reason for this is the large message complexity of currently known protocols, as has been
suggested by many systems papers [2, 4, 16, 44, 59]. The best known protocols have quadratic message
complexity, i.e., Θ(n2), where n is the number of nodes in the network.
King and Saia [33] described the first Byzantine agreement algorithm in synchronous complete networks
that breaks the quadratic message barrier under the assumption that nodes a priori know the identities of
all their neighbors. This assumption is called the KT1 model [50], where it is assumed that each node has
knowledge of the identities of its neighbors3 a priori. This is in contrast to the KT0 model [50], another
standard model where nodes do not know the identity of the neighbors. In the KT1 model, [33] presented
an algorithm where each processor sends only O˜(
√
n) messages, and thus the total message complexity
is bounded by O˜(n1.5). This was later improved by Braud-Santoni et al. [13] to O(n polylog(n)) total
message complexity, however, this protocol might require some node to send O(n) messages.
The KT0 model seems more applicable to modern, permissionless networks. While we can convert
algorithms forKT1 toKT0 by including an initial step where each node communicates with all its neighbors
to obtain their identities, this incurs a Θ(n2) message cost. Hence a fundamental question is: Can we design
Byzantine protocols that require sub-quadratic messages in the KT0 setting?
In this paper, we take a step toward addressing the above question. Our focus is on the fundamental
problems of Byzantine agreement, leader election and committee election. Our main result is an algorithm
to solve these problems while sending a number of bits that is O((T + n) log n), where T is the minimum
2Such as the public key for a digital signature.
3Just the identities of the neighbors, not any other information such as the internal states of the neighbors is assumed.
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of n2 and the number of bits sent by adversarially controlled (Byzantine) nodes, and n is the network size.
This kind of result where algorithmic cost is measured with respect to adversarial cost, is an example of
resource-competitive analysis [9, 28]. To the best of our knowledge, our result is the first of its kind that
introduces resource-competitive analysis to the study of Byzantine agreement and related problems. In
particular, our result shows that Byzantine protocols can be designed that compete well with the resources
(messages) expended by the Byzantine nodes; if they send less messages then the protocol also sends less.
An alternate way to interpret our result is that Byzantine nodes have to incur significant message complexity
(up to quadratic in n) in order to make the honest nodes to have large message complexity. We note that prior
work on Byzantine protocols all incurred quadratic message complexity (in the KT0 setting) regardless of
the behavior of the Byzantine nodes. Our protocol is efficient, lightweight, and fast (has low latency) and
can be used as a building block for designing secure and scalable systems.
1.1 Model
We consider a network of n nodes: t are bad and controlled by the adversary, and the remainder are good
and follow our algorithm; we assume t ≤ (1/4− 0)n for some constant 0 > 0.
We consider a synchronous, fully-connected network in the KT0 model [48, 50]. In particular, we
assume that a node has ports to every other node in the network, but learns the identity of each node reachable
through a port only by receiving a communication from that node. Thus a node sends to a new destination
only by selecting a port, or by responding to messages received. The n nodes are assumed to have distinct
ID’s which lie in [1, nk] for k is a (large) constant.4 Our adversary is full-information in that it knows the
states of all nodes at any time, is assumed to be computationally unbounded, and is also rushing in the sense
that it can read messages sent by good nodes before sending out its own messages. However, the adversary
is static, so that it must decide which nodes are bad prior to the start of the algorithm. We assume that
Byzantine nodes cannot fake their own identities, however they can forward fake messages on behalf of
other nodes.
1.2 Our Contributions
We solve three classic problems in this model. In Byzantine agreement, all good nodes must output the same
bit, which is the input bit of some good node. In leader election, all good nodes must agree on a leader, and
this leader must be good with constant probability. In committee election, all nodes must agree on a subset
of O(log n) nodes where the fraction of bad nodes in the subset is within a small  fraction of the overall
fraction of bad nodes.
Our main result is as follows.
Theorem 1.1. There exists a randomized algorithm that solves Byzantine agreement, leader election and
committee election in the above model. This algorithm sends an expected O((T + n) log n) messages, and
has latency O(polylog(n)), where T is the minimum of n2 and the number of bits sent by the bad nodes. It
is resilient to t ≤ (1/4− 0)n Byzantine faults for any fixed 0 > 0, and succeeds with probability 1− 1/nc
for any constant c.
We note that ourO(polylog(n)) latency bound holds even in the CONGEST model, where each message
is O(log n) bits. The algorithm KT0-BYZANTINEAGREEMENT described in Section 2 achieves the result
in Theorem 1.1, and the proof of this theorem is in Section 3.
To complement the above result we also show lower bounds for resource-competitive Byzantine agree-
ment (see Section 5). We prove that, in general, one cannot hope to design Byzantine protocols that have
4This means that an ID can be represented using O(logn) bits, which can be sent in a message. We assume the CONGEST
model, i.e., only O(logn)-sized messages are used in our algorithm.
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communication cost that is significantly smaller than the cost of the Byzantine adversary, i.e., the no. of
messages send by bad nodes. We first show a lower bound for deterministic BA protocols which is essen-
tially tight with respect to the upper bound of our resource-competitive randomized algorithm (see Section
5.1). We show that if T = O(n2) is the budget on the message bits of the Byzantine nodes, then for any
deterministic protocol, the total number of messages sent by the good nodes is Ω(T ) (see Theorem 5.1). The
deterministic lower bound holds even in the KT1 model. We then show a somewhat weaker lower bound on
the resource competitiveness of randomized BA protocols (see Section 5.2). The argument for the random-
ized case is more involved compared to the deterministic case, as the algorithm’s (future) random choices
are unknown to the Byzantine adversary. We show that if T = n1+α for some α ∈ (0, 1] is the budget of
the Byzantine nodes, then for any (randomized) BA algorithm in the KT0 setting, the total expected number
of messages sent by good nodes, is at least Ω(n1+
α
2 ) (see Theorem 5.2). Another significance of this lower
bound result is that it separates the message complexity of Byzantine agreement between KT0 and KT1
models in the randomized setting.
1.3 Techniques and other results
We focus first on Byzantine agreement, our solutions to leader and committee election use similar tech-
niques. Our algorithm depends on solutions to two new problems: Implicit Agreement and Promise Agree-
ment. In the Implicit Agreement problem, success means that strictly greater than a t/n fraction of good
nodes decide on the same (correct) bit and the remaining good nodes do not decide; and failure means that
no good nodes decide. Next, the Promise Agreement problem assumes there has first been either success or
failure in Implicit Agreement. In the case of success, Promise Agreement ensures all nodes decide on the
same value and terminate; in the case of failure, no nodes decide.
KT0-BYZANTINEAGREEMENT runs in epochs. In each epoch, we (1) run an algorithm for Implicit
Agreement; (2) run an algorithm for Promise Agreement; and (3) terminate in the case of success, or increase
computational effort in the case of failure.
The computational effort for Implicit Agreement is tuned by increasing the number of active nodes. In
particular, during a run of Implicit Agreement, the active nodes first attempt to solve Byzantine agreement
among themselves, and then to communicate the output to all other nodes in the network. Our Implicit
Agreement algorithm ensures that, unless the bad nodes send a number of messages that is n times the
number of active nodes, then Implicit Agreement will succeed. Next, we solve Promise Agreement. This
ensures that if Implicit Agreement succeeded, then all nodes will decide on the same value and terminate;
and if Implicit Agreement failed, then no nodes decide. In the latter case, all nodes proceed to the next epoch,
where the number of active nodes doubles in expectation.
LargeCoreBA. There are several technical challenges in the implementation of this main idea. The first
is to enable Byzantine agreement among the active nodes when the bad nodes do not send out too many
messages. We say that a node x has a view of node y if x knows y’s ID and the port to y. With a fair
amount of technical work, we show that it is possible to modify an algorithm by King et al. [34] to ensure
agreement even among nodes whose views only “mostly” overlap, provided that the range of all IDs is
only polynomially large. We call this modified algorithm LARGECOREBA, and summarize its properties in
Lemma 1 below; we believe the result may be of independent interest. The technical approach we used to
prove Lemma 1 is (1) a counting argument to show there are not too many bad nodes in the views of key
participants; and (2) the use of a sampler graph to ensure that these bad participants are well spread over the
committees, as used in [34] (see Section 4.1).
Lemma 1. Let G be a set of good nodes which wish to come to agreement. For each x ∈ G, let Sx
be the set of nodes in the view of x. Let B be the set of bad nodes in
⋃
x∈G Sx. Assume G ⊆
⋂
x Sx;
|B| ≤ (1− )|G|/2 for some fixed constant  > 0; and all nodes have distinct ID’s in [1, nk]. Then there is
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an algorithm LARGECOREBA which computes almost everywhere agreement with high probability among
(1 − 1/ log n) fraction of nodes in G in time and communication per node which is polylogarithmic in
|G|+ |B|. In one more round, if each good node broadcasts to all other nodes, and then each node takes the
majority, all nodes will come to agreement using |G|(|G|+ |B|) total messages, and latency polylogarithmic
in |G|+ |B|.
Implicit Agreement. Our solution to Implicit Agreement is given in Steps 1 to 6 of our main algorithm in
Section 2.1. There are two key technical problems that must be addressed.
First, how do we ensure that each active node x maintains a set Sx so that the conditions of Lemma 1
are matched? Also, in order to achieve a good competitive ratio, we need the conditions of Lemma 1 to
hold unless the adversary sends Ω(nA) messages, where A is the number of active nodes. If each active
node x naively adds to Sx all nodes y that it receives an initial message from, then the adversary can add
A Byzantine nodes to each Sx while sending only A2 messages. Thus, we must enlist the aid of non-active
nodes to establish the Sx sets. Initially, each active node sends its ID to all nodes. Call a good node light if
it has received a number of IDs approximately equal to A. Then the light nodes convey information about
their Sx sets to the nodes in Sx. They can not send out all the IDs in Sx, since that would be too many
bits. Instead, they just send out a single random ID, and a node y adds an ID to Sy if it was received from
“enough” (i.e. Θ(nA)) nodes that claim to be light.
Unfortunately, an adversary can still cause problems by making the size of the union of the bad nodes
in each Sx large, so that |B| is large in Lemma 1, even when the advesary does not send out too many
messages. To solve this problem, we use a “validation” step, whereby each active node, for each ID in Sx,
queries Θ(log n) random nodes about whether they have the ID in their Sx sets, and filters out the ID unless
enough of these queries are answered affirmatively. Based on information obtained during this process
(Step 1 through Step 3c in Section 2.1), the active nodes determine if the number of light nodes is sufficient
for favorable success in this epoch.
This brings us to the second problem. How can the active nodes agree on one of two options for this
epoch: (1) conditions are favorable for agreement; or (2) conditions are not favorable? We can make use of
LARGECOREBA in coming to agreement on an option. However, this is still challenging given that, under
certain conditions, some active nodes may run LARGECOREBA, while other active nodes may not even
have a small enough Sx set to run it. To address this issue requires careful decisions about whether a node
will run LARGECOREBA, what its input will be, and whether or not it will trust the output, all based on the
node’s estimate of the number of light nodes (See Step 4, Section 2.1 for details). In particular, nodes will
sometimes run LARGECOREBA, because other nodes are relying on them to do so, even when they plan
to ignore the output. If active nodes decide conditions are favorable via the first call to LARGECOREBA
(Step 4), they will all run it again (Step 5) to decide on a bit. Lemma 4 in Section 3 shows that no matter
what the number of light nodes, these two steps ensure all active nodes come to agreement on the same
decision.
Finally, in Step 6, active nodes send their decision to all other nodes. Nodes that have small Sx sets take
the majority of the messages received in this step, whereas other nodes default to a decision to wait for the
next epoch. We can thereby guarantee the post-condition for Implicit Agreement: either (1) a strictly greater
than t/n fraction of good nodes decide, or (2) no good nodes decide. We obtain this result even when the
adversary floods some good nodes but not others.
Promise Agreement. A final technical challenge is to determine whether or not we need to run another
epoch. After solving Implicit Agreement, either (1) strictly greater than a t/n fraction of the good nodes have
decided on the same correct bit; or (2) no good nodes have decided. We must then ensure that all good nodes
decide either to terminate or to run another epoch. To do this, we run an algorithm, PROMISEAGREEMENT
that solves the Promise Agreement problem (see Section 4.2). The solution simply has each node sample
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a logarithmic number of other nodes, and take a majority vote. It does not increase the overall asymptotic
number of messages sent, but some non-active nodes can be forced by the adversary to respond to O(n)
requests. If the outcome of PROMISEAGREEMENT is not agreement then all nodes proceed to the next
epoch, where the number of active nodes doubles in expectation. In this way, we can guarantee that that
KT0-BYZANTINEAGREEMENT succeeds within log(n) expected epochs.
1.4 Related Work
KT0 and KT1 Communication Model. KT0 and KT1 models are two well-studied standard models in
distributed computing (e.g., see [30, 48, 50]). It turns out that message complexity of a distributed algorithm
depends crucially (as explained below) on the initial knowledge of the nodes.5 For example, consider
the situation where there are no Byzantine nodes. It is known that Ω(n) expected messages are needed
for explicit leader election6 in a complete (fully-connected network) in the KT0 model (see e.g., [7, 40]),
whereas in the KT1 it takes no communication at all (since all nodes know each other’s IDs, the minimum
one can be selected). Similarly it has been shown for implicit leader election and implicit agreement7 that
Ω(
√
n) expected messages is a lower bound in the KT0 model [7]. It is known that for various fundamental
problems such as broadcast, spanning tree construction, minimum spanning tree construction there is a
significant gap in the message complexity between the two models. For example, for all the above problems
in an arbitrary graph withm edges, it is known that Ω(m) is a message lower bound in theKT0 model which
holds even for randomized (Monte Carlo) algorithms. However, in the KT1 model, this lower bound can be
breached: all these problems can be solved using randomized algorithms in O˜(n) messages [39]. For the
complete network case, it is known that minimum spanning tree construction needs Ω(n2) messages in the
KT0 model, while it can be accomplished in O˜(n) messages in the KT1 model. The recent work of Gmyr
and Pandurangan [30] gives several new algorithms in the KT1 model and shows many other separations
between the two models.
Resource-Competitive Analysis. This paper introduces resource-competitive analysis [9, 28] to the study
of Byzantine agreement. In resource-competitive analysis, the computational cost of the attacker, T , is
incorporated as a parameter in performance analysis. That is, the cost of executing an algorithm over a
network of n nodes is measured not only as a function of n, but also as a function of T .
Resource competitive analysis has been applied to designing algorithms for: jamming-resistant wireless
communication [27, 29, 36]; attack-resistance on multiple access channels [8], tolerating adversarial channel
noise [3, 19, 20], and efficiently distributing bridges for anonymity networks such as TOR [60]. See [9, 28]
for detailed surveys.
Related notions comparing the resources of good and bad nodes have been considered earlier, see e.g.,
the work of [25], that shows how to achieve fairness in secure computation (either both good and bad
parties obtain the result of the computation or nobody does) in the dishonest majority setting with a constant
competitive ratio in terms of computational costs/number of steps.
Other related works include [12] that focus on scalability of secure protocols and show how to achieve
sublinear communication.
Byzantine Agreement and Election. Byzantine agreement enables participants in a distributed network
to reach agreement on a decision, even in the presence of a malicious minority. Thus, it is a fundamental
5It is not hard to see that one can run the algorithms in the KT1 model after one round of communication between neighbors,
(which is all-to-all communication in a complete network).
6For explicit leader election, where all nodes should know the identity of the elected leader.
7In implicit leader election, only the leader node should know that it is the leader. In implicit agreement, it is enough if a
non-empty subset of nodes agree.
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building block for many applications including: cryptocurrencies [11, 23, 26, 31]; trustworthy comput-
ing [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 38, 55]; peer-to-peer networks [1, 47]; and databases [46, 51, 61].
In 2006, King, Saia, Sanwalani, and Vee [34] gave a (randomized) algorithm to solve Byzantine agree-
ment, leader election and committee election problems in a model differing from the one in this paper only
in the assumption of KT1 communication. This was the first algorithm to use only O˜(1) bits of communi-
cation per node, and O˜(1) time to bring almost all processors to agreement. This result can also be achieved
in a particular sparse network [35]. This initial work produced agreement among all but o(n) nodes. Further
work extended this result to achieve everywhere agreement, while using a number of bits that is O˜(n3/2)
(load-balanced) [32]; and O˜(n) (not load-balanced) [13]. All of these algorithms required each node to
play a particular role as determined by its unique ID in [1, n], and to send to specific neighbors. In other
words, these algorithms critically rely on the KT1 model. These bounds hold even if the bad nodes send
any number of bits. Establishing Byzantine agreement via the use of committees is a common approach; for
examples, see [26, 34, 42].
Paper Organization. Section 2 contains KT0-BYZANTINEAGREEMENT. Section 2.2 formally defines
Promise Agreement. Section 3 analyzes the correctness and cost of KT0-BYZANTINEAGREEMENT and
proves Theorem 1.1. In Section 4.1 we prove Lemma 1. In Section 4.2, we describe an algorithm to solve
Promise Agreement. In Section 5, we prove lower bounds. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 KT0-BYZANTINEAGREEMENT
Here, we describe the main algorithm for resource-competitive Byzantine agreement. It calls LARGECOREBA
and an algorithm PROMISEAGREEMENT that solves Promise Agreement. A node x calls LARGECOREBA
with a set of possible participants Sx, which may include nodes which do not themselves participate.
The algorithm below runs correctly with probability 1−1/nc for any constant c, when constant C below
is chosen to be sufficiently large, depending on c. We let  be a small constant such that 0 <  < 20. We set
maxa = (1 + )p(n− t) and mina = (1− )p(n− t) so that w.h.p. the number of active nodes lies in this
range.
We call a good node active if it sets its state to active in Step 2. We call a good node light if the
number of IDs received by it from alleged active nodes in Step 2 is less than maxa + pn. We use bounds
Low = n − 2t − n and High = Low + t to describe the number of light and purported light nodes. For
p > 1/C log n, if there are at least Low− t light nodes and each sends a random ID from their list of nodes
that reported being active in Step 2, then w.h.p., at least β = (1−)(Low−t)maxa+pn copies of all their common IDs, in
particular, the IDs of all active nodes, will be received by every active node. Finally, an element in an active
node x’s set Sx is validated when x queries a random set of C log n nodes and δC log n nodes respond yes.
δ = (1−)(Low−t)n is chosen so that w.h.p., every ID in active will be validated but not many ID’s of nodes
which are bad.
2.1 Pseudocode for KT0-BYZANTINEAGREEMENT
1. Initialize: Every node x sets p ← (C log n)/n. Each node x sets ready-outx ← 0, ready-inx ← 0,
and sets its state to ¬active and ¬light.
2. Nodes become active and notify others: With probability p, x sets its state to active and sends its
ID to all nodes. Every node x sets Sx to the set of IDs received. A node sets its state to light if
|Sx| ≤ maxa + pn.
3. Active nodes learn of other active nodes:
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(a) Every light node x randomly selects an ID in Sx and sends it to the nodes in Sx.
(b) Every active node x sets nx to be the number of nodes which send to x in Step 3a. If nx ≥
Low − t then x resets Sx to be the set of IDs which were received from at least β nodes. For
each ID in Sx, x sends the query < ID? > to a random set of C log n nodes.
(c) Every light node x answers a query < ID? > if ID is in Sx and the query is sent by a node in
Sx. An ID in Sx is considered validated if x received at least δC log n responses to the query
for ID. Each active node x that sent queries removes from Sx all IDs which are not validated.
4. Can we proceed? Each active node x with nx ≥ Low − t runs LARGECOREBA with the other
nodes in Sx. The input bit to LARGECOREBA, ready-inx ← 1 iff nx ≥ High. If nx ≥ Low then
ready-outx ← output of LARGECOREBA.
5. Compute Byzantine Agreement Each active node x with ready-outx = 1 runs LARGECOREBA
with nodes in Sx, with input bit, valuex, set to the node’s initial input bit.
Node x then sets valuex to the output of this LARGECOREBA.
6. Take Majority: Each active node, x, sends (ready-outx, valuex) to all nodes. Then, each node x with
nx ≥ Low− t sets ready-outx to the majority ready-out bit received from nodes in Sx. If this bit is 1,
then valuex is set to the majority value bit received from nodes in Sx.
7. Promise Agreement: Each node x runs PROMISEAGREEMENT with the tuple (ready-outx, valuex),
and resets the tuple based on the outcome.
(a) If ready-outx = 1, then node x terminates and outputs value valuex;
(b) Else if p < 1/(C log n), p doubles and x repeats from Step 2.
(c) Else {pn ≥ n/(C log n)} every node sends to all its neighbors to determine their IDs and all
nodes execute LARGECOREBA to compute Byzantine agreement.
2.2 Promise Agreement
Here we define a variant of the almost-everywhere to everywhere Byzantine agreement problem, which we
call Promise Agreement. In Section 4.2, we describe an algorithm, PROMISEAGREEMENT, to solve this
problem.
Definition 1. An algorithm is said to solve the Promise Agreement problem if it has the following properties.
1. If (i) there is at least a t/n+ 2 fraction of good nodes with tuple (ready-out, value) = (1, v), for the
same bit v; and (ii) all remaining good nodes have ready-out value of 0, then all nodes terminate with
tuple (ready-out, value) = (1, v).
2. If all good nodes have ready-out = 0, then all nodes terminate with ready-out = 0.
3 Analysis of KT0-BYZANTINEAGREEMENT
3.1 Correctness
We call one run of all the steps in the KT0-BYZANTINEAGREEMENT algorithm an epoch. We assume
t ≤ (1/4− 0)n for and fixed 0 > 0. We also assume that p < 1/(C log n) except in Step 7c.
Lemma 2. The following events occur w.h.p. in n.
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1. The number of active nodes is between mina and maxa.
2. If there are at least Low − t light nodes, then all active nodes receive at least β copies of the ID of
every active node in Step 3a.
3. If there are at least Low − t light nodes, then all active nodes will consider all IDs of active nodes
validated after Step 3c.
4. If an ID is contained in the Sx sets of at most (1 − )(δ − t/n)n light nodes in Step 3b, then that ID
will not be validated.
Proof. For each of these items there is a random variable X which is the number of successful independent
trials. In each case, we will show that E[X] ≥ C ′ log n for some constant C ′. Then, Chernoff bounds imply
that Pr(|X − E[X]| ≥ λE[X]) ≤ n−c, for any fixed λ < 1, and any fixed c, for C ′ sufficiently large [45].
1) Let X be the number of active nodes. Each node of at least n − t good nodes is active with probability
p. Since t < n/4 and p ≥ (C log n)/n, then E[X] ≥ (C/2) log n ≥ C ′ log n, where C in Step 1 is chosen
sufficiently large.
2) Fix an active ID. That ID is sent out from a particular light node with probability at least 1/(maxa+ pn).
Let X be the total number of copies sent of that ID. Then the expected number of copies sent out is at least
(Low − t)/(maxa + pn) ≥ C ′ log n, for any fixed C’, where constant C in Step 3b is chosen sufficiently
large. Hence, by Chernoff bounds, w.h.p., at least (1 − )E[X] = β copies of the fixed active ID are re-
ceived by each active node. Finally, a union bound over at most n possible active IDs that could be sent out
establishes the result.
3) Fix an active node v and an ID u, such that v queries about u in Step 3b. Let X be the number of light
nodes queried by v about ID u in this step. ThenE[X] = ((Low−t)/n)C log n ≥ C ′ log n, for any fixedC ′
forC in Step 3b chosen sufficiently large. Thus, by Chernoff bounds, w.h.p., at least (1−)E[X] = δC log n
nodes will answer queries for the ID u, and so node v will consider u validated. Finally, taking union bounds
over all choices for v and u shows that, w.h.p., all active nodes will be considered validated by all active
nodes.
4) Fix an active node v and an ID u, such that v queries about u in Step 3b. Assume there are exactly
(1− )(δ− t/n)n light nodes that contain the ID u in their Sx sets. Having fewer such nodes only decreases
the probability that node u is validated. Let X be the number of light nodes queried by v that answer the
query for ID u. Then
E(X) = (1− )(δ − t/n)C log n
=
(1− )(Low − t)− t
n
(1− )C log n
= ((1− )(1− 3(t/n)− )− t/n)(1− )C log n
≥ C ′ log n
where the last step holds for any C ′ for C chosen sufficiently large, provided that t/n < 1/4. Thus, by
Chernoff bounds, by setting λ = (1−/2)(1−)−1, we get that Pr(X ≥ (1−/2)(δ−t/n)C log n) ≤ n−c,
for any fixed c, for C sufficiently large. Let Y be the number of bad nodes that are queried by v about ID
u. Again by Chernoff bounds, Pr(Y ≥ (1 + /2)(t/n)C log n) ≤ n−c′ for any fixed c′ for C chosen
sufficiently large. Putting these two facts together shows that the number of nodes in the sample that may
answer v’s query about ID u is, w.h.p., less than δ.
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A union bound over all nodes v and IDs u completes the proof.
For a fixed epoch, let CORE be the set of active nodes that run LARGECOREBA in Step 4. We show
that the nodes participating in LARGECOREBA have the desired properties to successfully complete it when
there are at least Low − t light nodes. (See Lemma 1.)
From Lemma 2, we can observe the following.
Lemma 3. If there are at least Low − t light nodes then w.h.p., we have the following
1. Every active node is in the CORE, and therefore |CORE| ≥ mina.
2. For all x ∈ CORE, CORE ⊆ Sx after Step 3c.
3. Let B be the bad nodes in
⋃
x∈CORE Sx. At the conclusion of Step 3, if there are at least Low− t light
nodes, |B| ≤ ′pn for any ′ > 0, and |B||CORE| ≤ 1/2− ′′ for any ′′ > 0.
Proof. 1) Follows from the way nx is set in Step 3b, and also from Lemma 2(1).
2) Follows from Lemma 2(2) and Lemma 2(3).
3) We note that no bad ID will be present in an Sx unless it is validated, and by Lemma 2(4) w.h.p., this
requires at least
(1− )(δ − (t/n))n
light nodes which contain this ID in their Sx sets. A light node contains no more than maxa(1 + ) IDs, of
which at least mina number are active.
Since maxa(1 + )−mina < 4pn, there can be at most 4pn IDs of bad nodes contained in Sx for each
light node x. As there are no more than n light nodes, Lemma 2 implies that the total number of bad nodes
which are validated is less than
(n)
(
4pn
(1− )(δ − t/n)n
)
≤ 4pn
2
(1− )2(n− 4(1/4− 0)n− n)
=
4pn2
(1− )2(n+ 40n− n)
≤ 12
√
pn
(1− )2
< ′pn
Where the last line follows for any ′, provided that  is sufficiently small, and t < (1/4 − √)n; and
the second to last line follows since  was chosen such that 0 ≥
√
. Thus the total number of bad nodes in⋃
x∈CORE Sx is less than 
′pn.
Since CORE contains at least mina = (1− )p(n− t) good nodes, |CORE| ≥ (1− )p(n− t), and hence
|B|
|CORE| < 1/2− .
Lemma 3 and Lemma 1 imply that LARGECOREBA can be successfully run when there are at least
Low − t light nodes. The following lemma follows from this fact and from Lemma 2. Figure 1 illustrates
part of this lemma.
Lemma 4. Let L be the number of light nodes in an epoch of KT0-BYZANTINEAGREEMENT. Then w.h.p.,
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Number of Light Nodes
Low - t Low High
ready-out 0 0 all 0, or
all 1
1
ready-in 0 0 some 0,
some 1
1
Number
Running
Some All All All
Number
Trusting None Some All All
Output 
Correct? Maybe Y Y Y
Figure 1: This figure illustrates possible outcomes of LARGECOREBA in Step 4, based on what is proven
in Lemma 4. In each row, the different outcomes depend on the range of the number of light nodes (L),
as given on the line at the bottom of the figure. The first row gives the number of active nodes running
LARGECOREBA. The second row gives the number of active nodes that set their ready-out value to the
output of LARGECOREBA. The third row says whether or not LARGECOREBA actually runs correctly.
The forth row gives the possible ready-in values for the active nodes. Finally, the last row gives the possible
ready-out values for the active nodes after Step 4 is completed.
1. If High ≤ L,
1) All active nodes have ready-in = 1, they run LARGECOREBA and decide on ready-out = 1 when
run in Step 4; and
2) All active nodes y run LARGECOREBA in Step 5 and set their value bit to the input bit valuex of
some active node x.
2. If Low ≤ L < High,
1) All active nodes successfully run LARGECOREBA but they may start with differing values for
ready-out in Step 4.
2) If the output is a 1, all active nodes y set ready-out = 1 and they will successfully run LARGECOREBA
in Step 5 and set valuey to the input valuex for some active node x.
3) If the output is a 0, all active nodes set ready-out = 0.
3. If Low − t ≤ L < Low, all active nodes will successfully run LARGECOREBA in Step 4, though
some nodes will disregard the output. All active nodes will start with ready-in = 0 and all active
nodes will have ready-out = 0.
4. If L < Low − t, some active nodes may run a possibly flawed LARGECOREBA in Step 4, though
all active nodes will disregard the output. All active nodes will start with ready-in = 0 and end with
ready-out = 0.
Proof. IfL ≥ Low−t, then nx ≥ Low−t for all nodes x, thus in Step 4, all active nodes have ready-in = 0,
disregard the output of LARGECOREBA, and set ready-out = 0.
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By Lemmas 3 and 1, when L ≥ Low − t, LARGECOREBA will run successfully. If L < Low, then all
active nodes x have nx < High = Low + t, so in Step 4, all active nodes x have ready-inx = 0. Thus, by
the consistency property of LARGECOREBA, all active nodes x have ready-outx = 0.
If L < High, then all active nodes running LARGECOREBA in Step 4 may start with different ready-in
values, but by the correctness of LARGECOREBA, they will all end with the same ready-out value. If the
ready-out vale is 1, in Step 5, LARGECOREBA will run correctly and they will all set their value bit to the
input bit, valuex of some active node x.
If L ≥ High, then any active node x has nx ≥ High, and so has ready-inx = 1. Thus, after Step 4,
by the validity of LARGECOREBA, all active nodes will have ready-out = 1. Thus, they will all run
LARGECOREBA in Step 5 and will all set their value bit to the input value bit of some active node.
Lemma 5. At the end of each epoch, w.h.p., all nodes either terminate and output the same value or they all
go to the next epoch.
Proof. By Lemma 4, if any active node x sets ready-out = 1 after Step 5, all active nodes will set their tuple
(ready-out, value) to the value (1, v), and v will be the input bit of some node in CORE. Moreover, there
must be at least Low light nodes. Since every light node y has at least mina IDs of active nodes in Sy, and
|Sy| ≤ maxa+ n, in Step 6, the majority of the messages received from nodes with IDs in Sy will be (1, v)
and y will set ready-out = 1 and valuey = v. Since Low = n− 2t+  ≥ t+ 2, all good nodes will come
to agreement on (1, v) in Step 7, when the Promise Agreement problem is solved correctly (by Lemma 9 in
Section 4.2).
On the other hand, if any active node x sets their value ready-outx to 0, then we must be in Case 2,
3 or 4 of Lemma 4. In these cases, all active nodes have ready-out = 0, at the end of Step 5. Thus, all
light nodes set ready-out = 0 since it is the majority value received in Step 6, and all nodes which are not
light do not change their initial ready-out value from 0. Therefore, all nodes agree on ready-out = 0. With
ready-out = 0, all nodes execute Steps 7b or 7c, depending on the value of p.
3.2 Resource Costs
Lemma 6. In any epoch, w.h.p., the algorithm sends O((pn)2 log n+ pn2 +n log n+Te) messages, where
Te is the minimum of n2 and the number of messages sent by bad nodes in that epoch. Moreover, in any
epoch, the algorithm takes time polylogarithmic in n.
Proof. There are O(pn) active nodes which send to all nodes and each light node sends one message to
O(pn) nodes, for a total of O(pn2) messages. When Sx is reset, it is reset to be no larger than n/β =
O(np). To validate its Sx, each active node sends O(log n) messages for each element in Sx. There are
O(pn) active nodes, each with |Sx| = O(n/β) = O(pn). Hence, issuing queries requires O((pn)2 log n)
messages by good nodes. There are at most Te queries sent by bad nodes, so responding to queries requires
O(Te + (pn)
2 log n) messages.
Computing LARGECOREBA in Steps 4 and 5, requires O((pn)2) messages by Lemma 1. Then in
Step 6, all active nodes send to all nodes for O(pn2) messages. Finally, in Step 7, all nodes send O(n log n)
messages to solve PROMISEAGREEMENT, as shown in Lemma 9. Thus, the total number of messages sent
in the epoch is O((pn)2 log n+ pn2 + n log n+ Te).
The time to perform all steps in an epoch is dominated by the cost of performing LARGECOREBA which
is polylogarithmic.
Lemma 7. The algorithm terminates in a decision in a given epoch, unless the adversary sends Ω(pn2)
messages.
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Proof. There are at least High light nodes unless the adversary causes bad nodes to send more than pn
messages to n nodes, for a total of Ω(pn2) messages. If there are at least High light nodes in an epoch,
then by Lemma 4 the algorithm terminates with a decision.
Note that O((pn)2 log n+ pn2) = O(pn2) except when p > 1/ log n, in which case our algorithm runs
LARGECOREBA on all the nodes, by messaging all n of their neighbors, for a total cost of O(n2). This is
the bottleneck in the algorithm which causes it to be O(log n)-competitive instead of O(1)-competitive.
Let T be the minimum of n2 and the total number of messages sent by the adversary, and n be the
number of nodes in the network. We can now prove Theorem 1.1.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Proof. By Lemma 7, the algorithm will terminate in an epoch, unless the adversary sends cpn2 messages
in that epoch, for some constant c. In epoch i, p = (2i−1 log n)/n. If we do not terminate in epoch i, then
T ≥ c2i−1n log n. In epoch i, by Lemma 6, the total number of messages sent is O((pn)2 log n + pn2 +
n log n+ Te).
We first consider the case where it’s always true that p ≤ 1/ log n, and note thatO((pn)2 log n+pn2) =
O(pn2). Thus, the message cost in epoch i isO(n2i log n+Ti), where Ti is the number of messages sent by
the adversary in epoch i. The Ti terms clearly sum toO(T ). If ` is the last epoch, thenO(
∑`
i=1 2
in log n) =
O(2`n log n) = O(T + n log n). Thus the total number of messages sent in this case is O(T + n log n).
We next consider the case where p > 1/ log n. In this case, our algorithm runs LARGECOREBA on all
the nodes, by messaging all n of their neighbors, for a total cost of O(n2). The value of T in this case is
Ω(n2/ log n), so our total message cost is O(T log n).
Since epoch i has latency polylogarithmic in n (by Lemma 1), and there are at most log n epochs, the
total latency is O(polylog(n)). Additionally, we note that when the algorithm terminates, by Lemma 7, all
good nodes come to agreement on an input bit of some node in CORE.
Finally we note that we can also solve the leader election and committee election problems. To do this,
the active nodes use Feige’s leader election algorithm to elect a committee in one step, or a leader in log∗ n
steps among the COREx sets for every active node x. This is done instead of selecting an agreement value
as in the KSSV algorithm.
4 Additional Algorithms
4.1 LARGECOREBA
Here we prove Lemma 1. We do this by adapting the algorithm from [34]. In that paper, all nodes have a
view of all of other nodes and nodes are numbered [1, n].
The main idea of our adaptation is to show that for any s, log10 n ≤ s ≤ n, there exists a deterministic
assignment of IDs in [1, nk] to a set of s/ lnn committees, so that for every subset of size s IDs, a 1−1/ ln2 n
fraction of committees are (1) “sufficiently large”; and (2) contain a nearly representative fraction of both
good and bad nodes.
The algorithm in [34] is built upon a family of bipartite graphs with expansion-like properties. The
existence of such graphs are proved using the probabilistic method (see Section 3 of [34]). We need the
same properties here, but for a possibly much smaller subset of s ≤ n identities, which come from a much
larger name space ([1, nk]). We show that we can start with identities in the range [1, nk], of which s are
active and generate a set of committees which have the required properties with respect to the active nodes,
as is needed in each layer of the “election graph” in [34], Corollary 3.2.
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The following lemma achieves the needed result for the “static” network in that paper. We note that, in
our algorithm, each node in epoch i knows that the number of active nodes lies in the range (1± )2i log n
for a fixed constant , 0 <  < 1.
Lemma 8. Let k, c, fg, fb be any positive constants, where c, k ≥ 1, and (1 − ) ≤ fg + fb ≤ (1 + ).
Let i be an integer such that 1 ≤ i ≤ lg n/ lg lgn, and s = (1 + )2i log n. Further, let L = [nk], and
R = [s/ lnn] and Lg, Lb ⊆ L be any disjoint subsets where |Lg| ≥ fgs and |Lb| ≤ fbs. Also for any
bipartite graph over nodes (L,R), let Γ(r) denote the neighbors of node r ∈ R.
Then there exists a bipartite graph (L,R), where each node in R has degree d ≥ (C ln6 n)(nk/s),
C = 4kc/(1 − ), such that for all but a 1/ ln2 n fraction of nodes r ∈ R, all the following hold, with
probability 1− 3/nc:
1. Let Xs = |Γ(r) ∩ (Lg ∪ Lb)|. Then Xs ∈ (1± 1/ lnn)(fg + fb)C ln6 n.
2. Let Xb = |Γ(r) ∩ Lb|. Then Xb ≤ (1 + 1/ lnn)fbC ln6 n.
3. Let Xg = |Γ(r) ∩ Lg|. Then Xg ≥ (1− 1/ lnn)(1− 1/ lnn)fgC ln6 n.
Proof. Consider a bipartite multigraph with sides L and R where each node in R has d = (C ln6 n)(nk/s)
neighbors chosen uniformly at random with replacement from L. Fix disjoint sets Lg, Lb ⊆ L where
|Lg| = fgs and |Lb| = fbs; and fix R′ ⊆ R, |R′| = s/ ln3 n ≤ |R|/ ln2 n.
Let X be the number of edges from nodes in R′ to Lg. Then
E(X) = d|R′| · fgs
nk
=
dfgs
2
nkln3n
= Csfgln
3n.
By Chernoff bounds, for any positive λ, we have Pr(|X − E(X)| ≥ λ) ≤ 2e− λ
2
2E(X) . Setting λ =
(1/ lnn)E(X), we get
Pr(X ≤ (1− 1/ lnn)E(X)) ≤ 2e− (1/ ln
2 n)E(X)
2
≤ 2e− (1/ ln
2 n)(Csfg ln
3 n)
2
≤ 2e−Csfg lnn2 .
Let ξLg ,R′ be the event that for all nodes in R
′, condition (3) above fails. Let ξ = ∪Lg ,R′ξLg ,R′ , for all
Lg, R′ of appropriate size. Then by a union bound,
Pr(ξ) ≤
(
nk
fgs
)(
s/ lnn
s/ ln3 n
)
2e−
Csfg lnn
2
≤ efgs(k lnn) · 2s/ lnn · 2e−Csfg lnn2
≤ e−Csfg lnn2 +ln 2+s/ lnn+fgsk lnn
≤ 1/nc
The last line in the above holds for C > 4kc/(1 − ). Thus, with high probability, a random bipartite
graph satisfies condition (3) for all sets R′ and Lg. A similar analysis shows the same results for conditions
(1) and (2). Putting these three facts together, the probability that a random graph fails any one of these
properties is no more than 3/nc. In particular, such a graph exists.
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If we regard each node in R as a committee whose members are the set of neighbor nodes contained in
Lg ∪ LB , and if |Lg| > (1 + )(2/3)s and |Lb| ≤ (1 − )s/3, the nodes in Lg which are mapped to the
same committee can successfully run a linear time deterministic Byzantine agreement algorithm by Dolev
et al. [21], even if they do not know the exact number and names of all the bad nodes participating, since the
total number of bad nodes in any good node’s view mapped to the same committee is less than one third of
the good nodes mapped to the committee. Each good node may fail to send a message to some bad node, or
may fail to hear from some bad node, but a Byzantine agreement algorithm is resilient to a bad node which
fails to send a message. Thus, the algorithm from [34] will work correctly with high probability. Moreover,
this LARGECOREBA algorithm has latency that is polylogarithmic in the number of participants (active
ndoes), and requires each active node to send only a polylogarithmic number of bits.
Note that the algorithm from [34] is almost everywhere, i.e., all but 1/ log n fraction of good nodes
come to agreement. If we follow the last step with a step in which all active nodes send to each other, each
can take the majority, so that all active good nodes come to the same correct decision, for a total number of
messages ≤ (1 + )22i log2 n messages in phase i.
4.2 PROMISEAGREEMENT
We now present a simple algorithm to solve the Promise Agreement problem, defined in Section 2.2.
PROMISEAGREEMENT
1. Each node y sends a request to a random set of c log n nodes.
2. Each node x, upon receiving a request from a node y, responds to the request by reporting (ready-outx, valuex).
3. If greater than a t/n +  fraction of nodes sampled by x respond with ready-out = 1, then x
sets ready-out ← 1 and sets valuex to the majority of the value bits sent by sampled nodes. Else
ready-outx ← 0.
Lemma 9. PROMISEAGREEMENT solves the Promise Agreement problem (Definition 1), withO(1) latency,
and sending O(T ′ + n log n) bits, where T ′ is the minimum of n2 and the number of messages sent by the
adversary during this algorithm.
Proof. Assume there are at least a t/n+ 2 fraction of good nodes with (ready-out, value) = (1, v) for the
same bit v, and all remaining good nodes have ready-out values of 0. By Chernoff and union bounds, every
good node then has greater than a t/n +  fraction of good nodes with ready-out values of 1, and less than
a t/n +  fraction of bad nodes in their sample. Hence, all good nodes will terminate with tuple values of
(ready-out, value) = (1, v).
Assume that all good nodes have ready-out values of 0. Then by Chernoff and union bounds, each
sample has less than a t/n +  fraction of bad nodes. Hence, all good nodes will terminate with ready-out
values of 0.
The number of bits sent is just the number of queries sent which is O(T ′ + n log n).
5 Lower Bounds for Resource-Competitive Byzantine Agreement
We now study the lower bounds for resource-competitive Byzantine agreement (BA). We first show a tight
lower bound on the resource competitiveness of deterministic BA protocols. Then we show a lower bound
on the resource competitiveness of randomized BA protocols.
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5.1 Deterministic Lower Bound
As per our model (cf. Section 1.1) we assume a complete n-node network with n Byzantine nodes and
(1 − )n good nodes (i.e., non-Byzantine) for some small constant . We assume the KT0 model. The
Byzantine nodes are controlled by a non-adaptive rushing adversary. It is assumed that Byzantine nodes
cannot fake their own identities.
In the above setting, the goal is to show a lower bound on the message bits spent by the good nodes in
any deterministic algorithm solving Byzantine everywhere agreement. The lower bound also holds in the
KT1 model, in which a node knows the ID of its neighbors.
The output of the algorithm, i.e., the agreed value depends on the ID, input distribution of the nodes
and the information exchanged among the nodes during the execution of the algorithm. More precisely,
the output of a node u (with id IDu) is a function fu(IDu, bu, Xu) → {0, 1}, where the argument bu is
the input bit of u and Xu is the set of received message bits during the execution of the algorithm. Let us
call this information (IDu, bu, Xu) as “transcript” of u. The algorithm is deterministic and known to the
adversary which controls the Byzantine nodes. Further, the algorithm should work for any input distribution
(i.e., the 0− 1 value distribution). Given an input distribution over the nodes, the complete execution of the
algorithm is known to the adversary. Based on the execution, the adversary selects Byzantine nodes (in the
beginning) in such a way that the algorithm fails to achieve agreement everywhere unless it spends enough
messages. In fact, we prove the following result.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose the budget of messages of the Byzantine nodes is T ≤ cn2 bits, for some constant
c. Then any deterministic algorithm, which solves Byzantine everywhere agreement, incurs an expected
Ω(min{T, n2}) bits of messages.
Proof. Let there be a deterministic algorithmA that solves the Byzantine agreement everywhere and incurs
only o(T ) messages. We show a contradiction that the agreement is wrong in the sense that there exists two
nodes with two different output value for some input distribution. Consider an arbitrary input distribution I
over n nodes. Since the total messages send by the good nodes is o(T ), there must exist a node, say, u that
exchanges (sends and receives) less than δT/((1− )n) message bits in total for some small constant δ < 1
(the actual value of δ to be fixed later); otherwise the sum of the messages of all the good nodes would be
Ω(T ) (in fact, u is the node which spends minimum number of messages throughout the execution of A).
Let Su be the set of nodes which exchange messages with u throughout the execution of A on the given
input I. Note that, given A and I, u and Su are fixed and known to the adversary in the beginning. Further,
for different input I, the pair (u, Su) might be different. The adversary then selects all the nodes in Su as
Byzantine nodes before the execution starts. Thus the transcript of u is fully controlled by the Byzantine
nodes as Xu is determined by the nodes in Su. The transcript of u is the total history of messages between u
and the rest of the nodes. Clearly, the decision of u depends on the choice of u’s input value (0 or 1), u’s ID
and its transcript (which might also include the IDs of the nodes that it communicated with). Also, in a valid
protocol, every node (with every distinct ID and input value) will have a distinct transcript for deciding 0 or
1, respectively. Essentially, the adversary can decide a transcript for u (depending on its input value and ID)
such that the output value of u would be different than the output value of all other good nodes (assuming
all other good nodes execute the algorithm without any influence from the Byzantine nodes). This will give
a contradiction to the everywhere agreement.
We now show that there are enough Byzantine nodes and each Byzantine node has sufficient budget to
select all the nodes in Su as the Byzantine nodes (in the beginning). As explained above, the size of Su
could be at most δT/((1 − )n). Clearly Su 6= ∅ (otherwise, it won’t be a valid protocol). In other words,
1 ≤ |Su| ≤ dδT/((1− )n)e. Now consider the following cases.
Case 1: |Su| = 1. That is u exchanges at most δT/((1−)n) messages with a single node, sayw, throughout
the execution of A. If w is selected to be a Byzantine node, it must have a budget of at least δT/((1− )n)
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bits to be sent to u. Since the number of Byzantine nodes is n and their total budget is T , each Byzantine
node can send (up to) T/n messages on average, i.e., the average budget of each Byzantine node can be
(up to) T/n. We need,
δT
(1− )n <
T
n
which is satisfied for δ < (1−)/. Note that the remaining Byzantine nodes (i.e., which are not in Su) may
behave as the good nodes and response to the good nodes by following the algorithm A. They are chosen
from the nodes who spend lesser messages than the other nodes throughout the execution of A. Thus the
remaining Byzantine nodes is not spending more messages than the good nodes.
Case 2: |Su| = dδT/((1− )n)e. Then n Byzantine nodes are sufficient to select all the nodes in Su in the
beginning since (by assumption) T ≤ cn2 where the constant c = (1− )/δ is determined as:
δT/((1− )n) ≤ n
⇒ T ≤ ((1− )/δ)n2
Further, all the Byzantine nodes in Su have enough budget to communicate with u.
Case 3: 1 < |Su| < dδT/((1 − )n)e. This follows from Case 1 and Case 2. Case 1 says that a single
Byzantine node has sufficient budget to communicate with u. Thus all the nodes in Su have enough budget
to communicate with u. Also Case 2 says there are sufficient number of Byzantine nodes to select all the
nodes in Su as Byzantine nodes.
Thus we claim that, given any input distribution there is a good node u whose output (i.e., agreed value)
is completely controlled by the adversary as the adversary controls the transcript of u. Now we argue that the
algorithmA fails to achieve agreement everywhere for at least one of the following four input distributions:-
I1 : all the nodes get value 1, I2 : all the nodes get value 0, I3 : u gets 1 and rest get 0, and I4 : u gets 0
and rest get 1. Suppose the output of the algorithm A is constant, say all the nodes always output 1, then
the agreement is invalid for the input distribution I2. (Similarly invalid for I1 if output is always 0). If the
output is non-constant, i.e., the output depends on the input, IDs and the execution, then we show that there
exists two good nodes (one is u and any one from the remaining good nodes) that agree on two different
bits for one of the input distributions I3 and I4. Based on the input value of u (which is 1 for I3, and 0 for
I4) and its ID, the adversary decides the transcript of u in such a way that u’s output bit will be opposite to
the rest of the good nodes’ output bit. This contradicts that A solves the Byzantine agreement everywhere.
Thus the number of message bits sent by the good nodes is Ω(T ).
The above argument holds even if the IDs are known to the neighbors (i.e., KT1 model). The good
nodes, in particular the node u, can never determine the Byzantine nodes, since the adversary selects the
Byzantine nodes in the beginning and u can have interactions with the Byzantine nodes only.
5.2 Randomized Lower Bound
Let us first consider a complete network with n nodes V in the anonymous setting, i.e., nodes do not have any
identifiers. This can be extended to the non-anonymous KT0 setting, where nodes have unique identities.
Each node v has n − 1 ports through which it connects to the n − 1 other nodes. Thus, if a node sends a
message through a port p ∈ [n− 1] to another node v, then any message u receives through p is guaranteed
to be from v. As before, among the n nodes, a small fraction n (assumed to be integral) for a fixed  > 0
are Byzantine and denoted V b; let V g = V \ V b. Nodes can individually generate uniform and independent
random bits as needed, but we do not assume the availability of common coins.
Our goal is to show a lower bound on the message complexity for Byzantine Agreement in the above
setting (everywhere and with success probability 1) assuming that the adversary has full information and is
a rushing adversary. Let us recall the definition of the message complexity.
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Definition 2. For a given BA algorithmA, the message complexityMA (or justM when clear from context)
is defined as the maximum expected number of the sum of the bits sent by good nodes. The maximum
is taken over all possible adversarial strategies (i.e., choice of IDs, port assignments, input bits, and the
behaviour of the Byzantine nodes) and the expectation is over the random bits used by the nodes.
Overview of our approach. We show that if bad nodes can send Ω(n1+α) messages, then the good nodes
must send at least Ω(n1+α/2) messages, for any α ∈ (0, 1]. If we assume not (for the sake of contradic-
tion), then, good nodes can reach agreement while only sending o(nα/2) messages on average. Under this
situation, when any good node u sends a message to any other good node v, the bad nodes can bombard v
with nα/2 messages intended for denial of service (DoS). Node v will be unable to distinguish between the
legitimate message from u and these DoS messages from bad nodes. As a result, v will have to respond,
on average, to Ω(nα/2) messages from bad nodes first. This is more number of messages than what a good
node v can afford on average. Thus, several good nodes will not be able to establish two-way contact with
any other good node, which we then exploit to show the impossibility via an indistinguishability argument.
Theorem 5.2. Consider any BA algorithmA that guarantees that good nodes reach a valid agreement in the
anonymous KT0 setting as long as the number of messages sent by Byzantine nodes is at most B = n1+α
for some α ∈ (0, 1]. Then, the message complexityMA, i.e., the expected number of messages sent by good
nodes, is at least Ω(n1+
α
2 ).
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there is a BA algorithm A for which MA ∈ o(n1+α2 )
despite an adversarial budget of B. A quick upshot is that the average number of messages sent by good
nodes is o(n
α
2 ).
Our argument to show contradiction is structured as follows. We condition our entire argument on the
total number of messages sent by good nodes to be bounded by at most 2MA ∈ o(n1+α2 ), which occurs
with probability at least 1/2 by Markov’s Inequality. We first observe in Lemma 10 that good nodes receive
messages from at most o(nα/2) different other good nodes. Exploiting this, we then give three adversarial
scenarios. In all these scenarios, the Byzantine adversary employs a strategy in which half the Byzantine
nodes use a denial-of-service style attack to suppress responses from good nodes. Under this adversarial
strategy, we show in Lemma 11 that most good nodes are unable to establish two-way communication with
any other good node. The remaining half of the Byzantine nodes exploit this situation to make it difficult
for good nodes to distinguish between different scenarios that require different agreement values.
We begin with the following lemma that holds due to an elementary counting argument.
Lemma 10. Recall the condition that at most 2MA ∈ o(n1+α2 ) messages are sent by good nodes. Under
this condition, with high probability, each good node receives messages from at most O(MA/n + log n)
different good nodes.
Proof. Fix a good node u. Let Xv be an indicator random variable taking the value 1 if good node v
sent a message to u. Notice that E[Xv] = nv/n, where nv is the number of different nodes to which v sent
messages. The number of different good nodes from which u received messages is given byX =
∑
v∈V g Xv
and these Xv’s are independent owing to the fact that the ports at each node are independently permuted
randomly. By linearity of expectation,
E[X] =
∑
v
E[Xv] = (1/n)
∑
v
nv ≤ 2MA/n ∈ o(nα/2).
Thus, we can apply Chernoff bounds to show that Pr(X ≥ 12MA/n) ≤ 2−2MA/n. If MA ≥ n log n,
Pr(X ≥ 12MA/n) ≤ 1/n2 and applying the union bound over all u ∈ V g, we get the required result. On
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the other hand, if MA < n log n, then, E[Xv] < lognn and E[X] < log n, but we can still apply Chernoff
bounds and get
Pr(X ≥ 12E[X]) ≤ Pr(X ≥ 12 log n) ≤ 2−2 logn ≤ 1/n2.
Again, we get the desired bound when we apply the union bound over all u. The claim follows when we
combine the two Chernoff bounds.
We now wish to show a certain adversarial strategy under which, with non-zero probability, at least one
node will violate agreement. The Byzantine adversary’s strategy is as follows.
Port assignments. The nodes are interconnected randomly in the sense that each node has port numbers
1 through n − 1 through which it connects to the n − 1 other nodes and the adversary connects a
random permutation of the nodes to the n− 1 ports. The permutations used for each of the nodes are
(mutually) independent. Of course, the adversary will be aware of the port assignments.
Input bits. Recall that there are (1 − )n honest nodes V g. The Byzantine adversary chooses one of the
following three different scenarios.
Scenario 0: All good nodes are assigned 0.
Scenario 1: All good nodes are assigned 1.
Scenario 2: Exactly half of them V g0 (chosen uniformly at random) are assigned an input bit 0 and
the rest of them V g1 are assigned 1.
Denial of Service (DoS) Attackers. Out of the n Byzantine nodes, the adversary designates n/2 nodes
as DoS attackers (denoted D). These DoS attackers behave in a specific manner towards nodes in
V g. We now describe this behavior of the DoS attackers for a fixed node v ∈ V g. Whenever a node
u 6∈ D sends a message m to any good node v, the Byzantine adversary can observe this immediately
and rushes in with n
α
2 replicas of the (same message) m from n
α
2 DoS attackers denoted Du→v; the
same Du→v is used every time u sends a message to v. However, for any pair u 6∈ D ∪ {v} and
u′ 6∈ D ∪ {v}, u 6= u′, the adversary seeks to ensure that Du→v ∩ Du′→v = ∅. The adversary can
ensure this pairwise disjointness as long as the number of nodes that send messages to v is at most
o(n
α
2 ). This condition is in fact satisfied with sufficient probability (cf. Lemma 10) as long as the
Byzantine adversary ensures that the number of nodes in V b\D that contact v is at most o(nα2 ). Thus,
from v’s perspective, to establish two-way contact with some good node u, it must intuitively respond
to Ω(n
α
2 ) messages (on expectation), which is asymptotically more than its average budget.
Byzantine nodes that are not DoS attackers. The strategy of nodes in V b \D will be discussed later. We
reiterate that the strategy must ensure that no good node is contacted by more than o(n
α
2 ) nodes from
V b \D.
A message m from a node v to a node u is called a response if it is the first message from v to u and u
had sent a message to v no later than m. Under this definition, note that two messages, one from u to v and
the other from v to u, sent in the same round will be considered responses to each other when no message
transpired between them at any earlier point in time. This is however a rare event that we can safely ignore.
Furthermore, a response from v to u is called a good response if both v ∈ V g and u ∈ V g.
Lemma 11. The total number of good responses sent by nodes in V g is o(n) with probability at least
1− o(1).
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Proof. To aid in this proof, we first prove a claim about a simplified problem that we call the good apples
problem (GAP). In this problem, we have c¯ containers, c¯ ≥ c but c¯ ∈ poly(c), and each container has k
apples (where k ∈ Ω(c) for some  > 0), but exactly one apple is good in each container and the rest are
bad. We are allowed to pick a total of cA(k) apples, where A(k) ∈ o(k) but A(k) ∈ Ω(kε) for some ε > 0.
Each pick can be from an arbitrarily chosen bin, but the apple that is picked must be chosen uniformly at
random (UAR) and without replacement from the apples remaining in the chosen container. The goal is to
pick as many good apples as possible. As a preliminary observation, notice that it doesn’t help to pick from
a container after we have already picked the good apple from it. We now show that there is no strategy that
guarantees picking Ω(c) good apples with any reasonable probability.
Claim 5.3. The probability that the number of good apples picked exceeds αc for any fixed α > 0 is o(1)
regardless of the strategy used.
Proof Sketch. We argue that the optimal strategy to solve GAP is to greedily pick from a single (arbitrarily
chosen) container until we get the good apple in it and then moving to next container (chosen arbitrarily)
and repeating. The intuition behind this strategy is that, once we have invested in a container i with at least
one pick (while all others are unpicked), a pick from i is more likely to get the good apple than a pick from
any other container.
Now under the optimal strategy, we can let Xi be the indicator random variable that is 1 if the number
of picks from container i was at least k/2 given that the good apple in i was picked. Clearly, Pr(Xi = 1) ≥
1/2. Moreover, given the budget of cA(k) on the number of picks allowed,
∑
iXi ≤ 2cA(k)k . Let G denote
the total number of good apples that were picked. Notice that G is dominated by G∗, the negative binomial
distribution where p = 1/2 and we are required to see 2cA(k)k successes. Clearly, the probability that G
∗
exceeds 12cA(k)k can be viewed as the probability that the binomial random variable B(
12cA(k)
k , 1/2) is no
more than 2cA(k)k , which is o(1) by Chernoff bound.
We now return to proving that the number of responses is o(n) with probability at least 1 − o(1). We
can model the problem as a GAP. Each time a node u ∈ V \D sends a message to v ∈ V g, recall that nodes
in Du→v send the exact same message. These messages sent by Du→v ∪ {u} can be viewed as a container
with exactly one good message (i.e., the one sent by u) that v needs to respond to. Since the total budget
of messages that good nodes can send is o(n1+α/2), the total number of such “containers” can be at most
c¯ = o(n1+α/2) and each container has k = nα/2 + 1 apples (corresponding to the DoS messages and the
good message). Since the total message complexity 2MA is at most o(n1+α/2) = n × o(nα/2), we get the
GAP instance by setting c = n and A(k) = o(nα/2). From Claim 5.3, we know that the number of good
apples picked is o(c) with probability at least 1−o(1), which translates to the claim that the number of good
responses is o(n) with probability at least 1− o(1).
The upshot is that a randomly chosen node v ∈ V g will not send any good response with probability at
least a constant both under Scenario 0 and Scenario 1. Thus, this node (with constant probability) will have
only managed to establish one-way communication with other good nodes. Let I(v) ∈ V g denote the set of
good nodes that sent messages to v. By Lemma 10, |I(v)| ∈ o(nα/2). Since A guarantees BA everywhere,
v will be able to correctly decide on 0 (resp., 1) for Scenario 0 (resp., Scenario 1).
LetA(v, b) denote the strategy used by the nodes in I(v) under Scenario b for b ∈ {0, 1}. For our lower
bounding purpose, we can assume that all decisions by A(v, b) are made by a single coordinator within
I(v). The coordinator executingA(v) decides the content and timing of the messages sent by nodes in I(v)
to v. We assume that the coordinator is aware of I(v) from the beginning. We even assume that it is aware
of all messages sent by v. We are justified in making these assumptions because they only strengthen the
algorithm. This strategy A(v, b) always ensures that v correctly decides on b under Scenario b, b ∈ {0, 1}.
In particular, it is resilient to all counter strategies by the Byzantine adversary.
19
Notice however that A(v, b) can be executed by V b \D as well because these strategies only entail the
Byzantine adversary playing the role of coordinator, choosing o(nα/2) Byzantine nodes and using them to
send appropriate messages to v at appropriate times. Of course, the Byzantine nodes are also aware of all
messages sent by v.
Now, in order to complete the indistinguishability argument, we let the Byzantine adversary pick two
nodes v0 and v1 uniformly at random under Scenario 2 and interact with them in such a way that they decide
contradicting values. We condition on v0 and v1 starting with input values 0 and 1, respectively, which
is anyway guaranteed to occur with probability 1/4 under Scenario 2. Moreover, the two nodes will not
send any good response with constant probability. The Byzantine adversary then uses nodes in V b \ D to
execute A(v0, 0) and A(v1, 1) towards v0 and v1, respectively. Specifically, the Byzantine adversary picks
the o(nα/2) nodes from V b \ D to execute A(v0, 0) (resp., A(v1, 1)) and – upon observing messages sent
and received by v0 and v1 in each round – coordinates the chosen nodes to rush in with responses just as
A(v, 0) (resp., A(v, 1)) would towards v under Scenario 0 (resp., Scenario 1). Since v decided correctly
under both Scenarios 0 and 1, the two nodes must decide on 0 and 1, respectively, because their executions
in Scenario 2 is indistinguishable from their respective executions in in Scenarios 0 and 1. Thus, with some
constant probability, they reach contradicting decision values under Scenario 2.
Extension to non-anonymous setting We finally point out how to extend easily the above result to the
non-anonymous setting, where honest nodes have unique identifiers; however, Byzantine nodes can fake
their identifiers.8 This can be done by an easy reduction to the anonymous setting. Suppose in the non-
anonymous setting there is a protocol that violates the lower bound shown in the anonymous setting. At
the beginning of the protocol in the anonymous setting, honest nodes choose a random ID between [1, n3];
it is easy to see that they are all unique with high probability. They then execute the protocol of the non-
anonymous setting.
6 Conclusion
We have described an efficient randomized resource-competitive algorithm to solve Byzantine agreement,
Leader election and Committee election, in the KT0, synchronous communication model, with a static and
full-information adversary. Our algorithm is efficient in the sense that message cost and latency grow slowly
with the number of messages sent by the adversary. In particular, our algorithm uses O((T + n) log n) bits
of communication, and has latency O(polylog(n)), where T is the minimum of n2 and the number of bits
sent by the nodes controlled by the adversary. Further, it succeeds with high probability. We also show lower
bounds on resource-competitive Byzantine agreement algorithms. Our lower bounds show that in general,
it is not possible to do significantly better than our algorithm with respect to the number of bits sent by
Byzantine nodes. A key open problem is to close the gap between upper and lower bounds for randomized
protocols across all budget values.
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